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image by Eugene Ipavec, 09 May 2007
The Syrian Interim Government (SIG) is an alternative government in Syria,
formed by the umbrella opposition group, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.
The interim government indirectly controls some areas of the country and claims
to be the sole legitimate government on behalf of the Syrian opposition in
defiance of the Council of Ministers of the Syrian Arab Republic. The interim
government's headquarters in Syria are located in the city of Azaz in Aleppo
Governorate.
At a conference held in Istanbul on 19 March 2013, the
Syrian National Coalition (SNC) elected Ghassan Hitto as prime minister of a
Syrian interim government. Hitto announced that a technical government would be
formed led by 10 to 12 ministers, with the minister of defence to be chosen by
the Free Syrian Army. At first, the SIG was "based in exile and lack[ed] an
organizational base inside Syria." It was intended that the new ministries would
not be placed in a single location but distributed in regions under the control
of the Syrian opposition.
The SIG has been the primary civilian authority
throughout most of Syria's opposition-held areas. Its system of administrative
local councils operate services such as schools and hospitals in these areas.
The interim government was based in Turkey and has received direct funding
from the United States.
In opposition areas outside the Turkish-occupied
ones, the SIG has been in conflict with the Islamist Syrian Salvation Government
(SSG) for control since September 2017 since the SSG claims that organizations
established in exile which do not have a foothold nor can take decisions of
national scope cannot represent the Syrian people (source:
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/syria/syrias-north-western-front-erupts).
On December 30, 2017, at least 30 factions operating under the banner of the
Syrian Interim Government merged in a unified armed group after four months of
preparations as announced as Syrian National Army (SNA) (previously the
Free Syrian Army (FSA) and also known as
the
Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (TFSA).
Source:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_Interim_Government
For additional information go to Syrian Interim Government (official
website):
https://en.etilaf.org/soc-institutions/syrian-interim-government
Esteban
Rivera, 9 December 2024
image located by Elias Granqvist, 9 December 2024
Full image at
https://www.facebook.com/photo
The image above shows the flags beside Mohammed al-Bashir who are reported to
become the interim leader of Syria now. Shown are a white flag with
shahada, the 1932
Syrian flag and the SIG logo flag.
Elias
Granqvist, 9 December 2024
The flag used by the SIG is the old national flag.
Esteban
Rivera, 9 December 2024
image located by Esteban
Rivera, 9 December 2024
Source:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_Interim_Government
image located by Esteban
Rivera, 3 January 2025
The version in silver outline is in use
since at least 2013 (source:
https://www.facebook.com/photo), and there seems to be a newer version in golden outline in use
since at least 2016 (source:
https://www.facebook.com/photo).
Esteban
Rivera, 3 January 2025
image
located by Jason Saber, 17 December 2024
image
located by Jason Saber, 4 February 2025
Erdogan of Turkey and Syria's new interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa hold a
joint news conference after their bilateral meeting today - note the Syrian flag
in use (Feb 2025).
Jason Saber, 4 February 2025
The same happened in December 2024 when this state visit occurred:
https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/1873673634252009827/photo/1
Zachary Harden,, 4 February 2025
image located by Elias Granqvist, 9 December 2024
Full image at
https://www.facebook.com/photo
The new government in Syria frequently shows its spokesmen with two adjacent flags - a white flag with shahada and the green-white-black tricolor.
An analysis from Weekly Analyst Review:
19 December 2024
Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is making significant strides in presenting itself as a viable, comprehensive governing body in Syria, with its arrival in Damascus symbolising the next phase of its transformation from an armed Salafi-Jihadist organisation to a political force aiming to fill the void left by the Assad regime. Unlike earlier arrivals of fragmented groups from southern Syria, HTS is leveraging its shadow governance experience from Idlib, spearheaded by the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), to position itself as a legitimate contender for Syria’s future government. Central to this effort is its dual-symbolism approach—displaying both the Salafi-Jihadist shahada flag and the nationalist Free Syrian tricolour during a high-profile meeting between former Assad officials and SSG representatives. These two flags symbolise the ideological spectrum HTS is attempting to straddle: the pan-Islamist aspirations of its core Salafi-Jihadist supporters and the more nationalist sentiment popular among ordinary Syrians opposed to Assad.William Garrison, 19 February 2025
The Shahada Flag and the Free Syrian Tricolor: A Dual Strategy
The Shahada flag reaffirms HTS’ Islamist roots, borrowing from a legacy of global jihadist movements such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). While its association with transnational Salafi-Jihadist ideology is undeniable, HTS has sought to adapt this image, maintaining Islamist credentials while simultaneously downplaying controversial internationalist ties. In parallel, its cautious acceptance of the Free Syrian tricolour marks a pragmatic pivot to broaden its appeal. While Syrians widely embrace the tricolour as a symbol of opposition to Assad, it contrasts sharply with HTS' doctrinal disdain for nationalist symbols. HTS’ dual-flag strategy reflects its effort to reconcile these opposing forces and mitigate criticisms that it remains a foreign-dominated entity with Salafi-Jihadist ambitions. Yet, the reluctance to fully embrace nationalist symbols highlights the persistent tension between its Islamist ideology and its ambition to govern a diverse, fractured Syria.
Authoritarian Governance and Persistent Contradictions
Despite these symbolic shifts, HTS’ credibility as a governing entity is undermined by its authoritarian practices, including suppressing dissent, deploying morality police, and running torture prisons. While adopting nationalist rhetoric and symbols may placate some, it cannot erase the group’s Salafi-Jihadist origins or its track record of human rights abuses. Efforts to merge Islamist internationalism with Syrian nationalism—such as the brief experiment with the "Shahada tricolour"—failed to resonate with either camp. Instead, the two-flag approach now serves as a calculated compromise, allowing HTS to appear inclusive without alienating its hardline base. However, such symbolic concessions belie the reality that HTS’ legitimacy remains deeply tied to its Islamist ideology and its support from foreign fighters committed to a broader Islamic caliphate. This dual identity is both HTS’ strength and its limitation as it seeks to transition from a militant group to a political force.
Technocratic Modernism and Concessions to Turkish Influence
Beyond flags, HTS has used its governing body, the SSG, to promote an image of technocratic modernism, employing logos and designs that blend Islamic art with contemporary aesthetics. These visual elements underscore the SSG’s claim to administrative competence and a vision of modern Islamic governance. However, omitting contested territories such as Hatay Province from its stylised maps suggests a quiet acceptance of Turkish sovereignty—a concession likely driven by HTS’ dependency on Turkish logistical support. This implicit acknowledgement of Turkey’s dominance, coupled with HTS’ muted response to other sovereignty challenges like Israeli airstrikes, raises doubts about its capacity to protect Syria’s territorial integrity or assert meaningful independence on the global stage. Ultimately, while HTS has refined its political messaging, its attempts to rebrand itself as a legitimate government remain fraught with ideological contradictions and practical vulnerabilities that call into question its long-term viability.
(see also: Kata'ib al-Hamza)
image located by Bill
Garrison, 2 December 2024
This is the one flag of the Hamza Division, sometimes called "Liwa"
(Brigade). The image displays both logos over a horizontal background, the Hamza
Division logo (towards the hoist) and the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division (towards
the fly) and below an inscription in Arabic in black lettering (perhaps the name
of the overall umbrella organization).
It was originally established in
September 2016 and initially was an operational Unit of the
Free Syrian Army.
Source:
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liwa_Sultan_Souleymane_Chah
By the end
of June 2017, most Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army reorganized themselves into
three military blocs (Divisions): Victory, Sultan Murad and the Levant. A number
of other groups remained independent. On December 30, 2017, the groups unified
to form the National Army (now Syrian National Army). By this time, three
"Legions" (Corps sized military Units) were established as part of the SNA: 1st,
2nd, and 3rd Legions. On March 15, 2018, rebel factions in northern Homs
Governorate formed the 4th Legion, though it later transferred to northern
Aleppo. Once outside the Murad Division
On October 4, 2019, the National
Front for Liberation joined the National Army's command structure, planning to
become its 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Legions.
According to a
2019 research paper published by the
pro-government Turkish think tank SETA, "Out of the 28 factions in the Syrian
National Army, 21 were previously supported by the United States, three of them via the
Pentagon's program to combat Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Eighteen of these
factions were supplied by the CIA via the MOM Operations Room in Turkey, a
joint intelligence operation room of the "Friends of Syria" to support the
armed opposition. Fourteen factions of the 28 were also recipients of the
U.S.-supplied TOW anti-tank guided missiles." (the report quoting another
source published earlier:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-08-02/end-cia-program-syria).
Source:
https://www.aymennjawad.org/2019/11/the-structure-of-the-syrian-national-army
It is then an operation unit of the much broader Syrian National Army (SNA)
also known as Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (TFSA) and within
the SNA, it is part of the Syrian Front
for Liberation, itself an operational coalition of forces formally
established on September 9, 2021 (source:
https://en.suriyegundemi.com/new-mergers-in-the-syrian-national-army). The
Syrian Front for Liberation then traces its origins to the previous National
Front for Liberation established formally on May 28, 2018.
Source:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_Front_for_Liberation and
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Front_for_Liberation
The Syrian National
Army, SNA, is the umbrella organisation of a loose formation of militias
backed by Türkiye and several
Gulf states and
consists of former Free Syrian Army (FSA) groups, Islamist factions,
Syrian Arab Army defectors,
civilians, as well as Syrians who have sought refuge in Turkey. The SNA
controls two areas adjoining the Turkish border, the first covers the
northern countryside of Aleppo from Afrin to Jarablus, and the second one
spans from Tall Abyad to Ras al-Ayn, in the north of Raqqa and Hasaka
governorates. It is composed of "more than 40 SNA factions". "Although the
SNA formally reports to Hasan Hamade, the head of the Ministry of Defense of
the oppositional Syrian Interim Government (SIG), it is in fact run by the
Turkish intelligence service (as of 2023)
(source:
https://euaa.europa.eu/sites).
Closely aligned with the Turkish government,
the SNA has been described as an auxiliary army of the Turkish Armed Forces and
also as "mercenaries" by their critics. Outside Syria, SNA fighters have been deployed by Turkey as a proxy
force, for example in conflicts from Libya to the south Caucasus. The SNA mostly consists of
Arabs and Syrian Turkmen.
Source:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_National_Army
The logo of the SNA is the same as the Syrian Interim Government (SIG). The previously
mentioned logo (silver version) dates to (at least) 2013 (source:
https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=481948668549161&set=a.248703963961633).
However, there seems to be a variant logo (golden version) in use since (at
least) 2016 (source:
https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1047373362006686&set=a.248703963961633), which in turn, is a variant logo for the SIG.
Esteban Rivera, 4 January 2025
Sultan Suleiman Shah Division
images located by Esteban Rivera, 4 January 2025
Sources:
https://syriadirect.org,
https://twitter.com/alhamza_brigade
The Sultan Suleiman Shah
Division logo features a black RPG-7 launcher (with grenade included)
silhouette (on the left), a shield with three five-pointed red stars on top
(the one in the middle bigger that the other two), with the inscription
inside in Arabic and golden lettering from top to bottom: the Shahada Division, Sultan Suleiman and Sha, with a FN FAL battle rifle silhouette (on the right). Notice a shade
inside the logo, in what appears to be a darker cube, representing most
likely the Kaaba.
Esteban Rivera, 4 January 2025
Hamza Division
images located by Esteban Rivera, 4 January 2025
Sources:
https://syriadirect.org,
https://twitter.com/alhamza_brigade
The Hamza Division logo has an inscription on top in
Arabic, black lettering with the organization's name and below another inscription in Arabic, black lettering "
قوات خاصة" (Special Forces) within a black semicircle pointing
upwards, with three five-pointed red stars on top (the one in the middle
bigger that the other two).
Esteban Rivera, 4 January 2025